This paper approaches Walker’s work from the perspective of the ubiquity of human rights language within the rhetoric of global constitutionalism. Building on Walker’s description of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, what I wish to suggest is that the spread of human rights discourse is intimately connected with attempts to apply constitutional discourse beyond the state. By highlighting the way in which human rights have become place-takers for political legitimacy in discussions of international constitutionalism, the paper is intended to challenge Walker to state his own position more forcefully and to develop further his insight concerning the irresolvable tension in the iterative relationship between constitutionalism and democracy.

The complexity of the relationship between democracy and modern constitutionalism is revealed by treating democracy as an incomplete ideal. This refers both to the empirical incompleteness of democracy as unable to supply its own terms of application – the internal dimension – and to the normative incompleteness of democracy as guide to good government – the external dimension. Constitutionalism is a necessary response to democratic incompleteness – seeking to realize (the internal dimension) and to supplement and qualify democracy (the external dimension). How democratic incompleteness manifests itself, and how constitutionalism responds to incompleteness evolves and alters, revealing the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy as iterative. The paper concentrates on the iteration emerging from the current globalizing wave. The fact that states are no longer the exclusive sites of democratic authority compounds democratic incompleteness and complicates how constitutionalism responds. Nevertheless, the key role of constitutionalism in addressing the double incompleteness of democracy persists under globalization. This continuity reflects how the deep moral order of political modernity, in particular the emphasis on individualism, equality, collective agency and progress, remains constant while its institutional architecture, including the forms of its commitment to democracy, evolves. Constitutionalism, itself both a basic orientation and a set of design principles for that architecture, remains a necessary support for and supplement to democracy. Yet post-national constitutionalism, even more than its state-centred predecessor, remains contingent upon non-democratic considerations, so reinforcing constitutionalism’s normative and sociological vulnerability. This conclusion challenges two opposing understandings of the constitutionalism of the global age – that which indicts global constitutionalism because of its weakened democratic credentials and that which assumes that these weakened democratic credentials pose no problem for post-national constitutionalism, which may instead thrive through a heightened emphasis on non-democratic values.

This paper argues that Neil Walker’s analysis of the complementary relationship between democracy and constitutionalism remains one-sided. It focuses only on the incompleteness of democracy and the democracy-realizing function of constitutionalism rather than also taking into account the reverse complementary and constitution-realizing function of democracy. In this paper, I defend a fuller account that takes into account this mutual complementarity between democracy and constitutionalism. Such an alternative approach is consequential for Walker’s argument in two respects. In terms of the general analysis of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism, my adjusted approach leads to a defence of the Habermasian thesis of the co-originality of constitutionalism and democracy which is too quickly dismissed by Walker himself. A fuller appreciation of this co-originality suggests that the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is perhaps, after all, more singularly complementary (as opposed to being both complementary and oppositional) than Walker recognizes. In terms of the more specific analysis of the impact of globalization, this adjusted approach tilts the argument in favour of the critics of current practices of postnational constitutionalism. Without complementary postnational democratic structures, this constitutionalism remains problematic and potentially oppressive.

This essay complements Walker’s essay with some historical and constitutional observations. It submits that Walker’s analysis is based to a large extent on reasoning derived from a particular continental European constitutional tradition. This creates certain problems of its own, that do not arise in a different constitutional tradition. This is not to say, however, that this invalidates his conclusions, but rather underpins them in an alternative manner.

This reply to critics reinforces and further develops a number of conclusions of the original paper. First, it answers the charge that it is biased in its discussion of the relative standing of constitutionalism and democracy today, tending to take the authority of the former for granted and concentrating its critical attention unduly on the incompleteness of democracy, by arguing that contemporary constitutionalism is deeply dependent upon democracy. Secondly, it reiterates and extends the claim of the original paper that the idea and practice of democracy is unable to supply its own resources in the development of just forms of political organization. Thirdly, it defends its key understanding of the overall relationship between democracy and constitutionalism as a ‘double relationship’, involving both mutual support and mutual tension. A fourth and last point is concerned to demonstrate how the deeper philosophical concerns raised by the author about the shifting relationship between democracy and constitutionalism and the conceptual reframing they prompt are important not just as an explanatory and evaluative window on an evolving configuration of political relations but also as an expression of that evolution, and to indicate how this new conceptual frame might condition how we approach the question of a democracy-sensitive institutional architecture for the global age.

This paper agrees with Walker on the existence of a tension between democracy and constitutionalism, but questions whether democracy and (international) constitutionalism necessarily depend on each other. While democracy needs constitutionalism on normative grounds, as an empirical matter it may also rest on alternative political structures. Moreover, it is questionable whether democracy is indeed the solution to the incompleteness of international constitutionalism. Traditional forms of democracy do not lend themselves well to transplantation to the international level and could even intensify some problems of international governance. Attempts to democratize international relations should be carried out prudentially, with due regard for possible counterproductive effects.

There are two fundamental problems with regard to the freedom of religion. The first concerns the content and scope of the right; the second, a possible unequal treatment between population groups. The first problem can only be dealt with by a preliminary analysis of the religious phenomenon, which precedes a legal definition. It turns out that there is a range of different types of religion, with on the one hand traditional forms of religion which are narrowly interwoven with the culture in question (all kinds of ‘cultural’ practices possessing a religious dimension), and on the other forms of religion which loosen to a considerable extent the ties between culture and religion. Evidently, the former types of religion cause problems in modern society. An additional problem is that freedom of religion as a modern basic right rests on a view of human being – including the idea of the inherent dignity and autonomy of the human person – which is at odds with the symbolic universe of traditional religion. The conclusion of the article is that in the modern pluralist society freedom of religion is on its way to becoming, or already has become, an unmanageable right. So the problems arising around this right (including that of unequal treatment) can only be solved in a pragmatic, not really satisfactory way. In that context, modern humanitarian standards should be observed in the implementation of the right of freedom of religion because fundamental human rights are connected with a specific concept of humanity.

Jerker Spits, book review of Marc de Wilde, Verwantschap in extremen. Politieke theologie bij Walter Benjamin en Carl Schmitt

Bertjan Wolthuis’ book review of Luuk van Middelaar, De passage naar Europa. Geschiedenis van een begin

Martin Buijsen’s book review of B.C. van Beers, Persoon en lichaam in het recht. Menselijke waardigheid en zelfbeschikking in het tijdperk van de medische biotechnologie

Jaap Zwart and Femke Storm, book review of Wilbert Mennings, Wouter Veraart en Pieter Edelman (red.), Voorlopig ben ik humanist. Teksten en voordrachten van Jan van Zijverden (1928-2003)

This article draws on Hans Kelsen’s theory of democracy to argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the democratic legitimacy of either the European Union (EU) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The legitimacy problems from which the EU in general and the ECJ in particular are alleged to suffer seem to result mainly from our rigid adherence to the outdated conception of democracy as popular self-legislation. Because we tend to approach the Union’s political and judicial practice from the perspective of this democracy conception, we are not able to observe what is blindingly obvious, that is, the viability and persistence of both this mega-leviathan and the highest court thereof. It is, therefore, imperative that we modernize and adjust our conception of democracy in order to comprehend the new reality to which these bodies have given rise, rather than to call for ‘reforms’ in a futile attempt to bring this reality into accordance with our ancient preconceptions about what democratic governance ought to be. Kelsen is the democratic theorist whose work has enabled us to venture into that direction.

Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing argue in their book, Governing Security, that the state has lost its monopoly on the governance of security. Private security arrangements have formed a networked governance of security in which the criminal law of the state is just one of the many knots or ‘nodes’ of the security network. Johnston and Shearing consider On Crimes and Punishment, written by Cesare Beccaria in the 18th century, as the most important statement of the classical security program which has withered away in the networked governance of the risk society. This article critizes the way Johnston and Shearing analyze Beccaria’s social contract theory and it formulates a Beccarian theory of the criminal law and nodal governance which explains the causes of crime and the rise of nodal governance and defends the central role of the state in anchoring security arrangements based on private contracts and property rights.

“Het waren mijn genen, edelachtbare, niet ik” kopte NRC Handelsblad van donderdag 5 november 2009.¹xFolkert Jensma, “Het waren mijn genen, edelachtbare, niet ik”, NRC Handelsblad, 5 november 2009. Het artikel bericht over een Italiaanse rechtszaak waarin in hoger beroep de straf die aan een moordenaar werd opgelegd, werd verlaagd van twaalf naar negen jaar. De raadsheer nam deze beslissing, aldus de verslaggever, nadat twee neurowetenschappers van de universiteiten van Pisa en Padua op een hersenscan onregelmatigheden hadden aangetoond en bovendien afwijkingen waren gevonden in het MAOA-gen, dat ook wel bekendstaat als het ‘agressiegen’.

Noten

• 1 Folkert Jensma, “Het waren mijn genen, edelachtbare, niet ik”, NRC Handelsblad, 5 november 2009.

Arend Soeteman, book review of Jan Smits, Omstreden rechtswetenschap, Over aard, methode en organisatie van de juridische discipline

Peter van Schilfgaarde, book review of Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice

Thom Holterman, book review of Jacques Langlois, Misère du droit.

The legal scholars Paul Scholten (1875-1946) and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) had much in common. The most significant agreement is their emphasis on the influence of a (religious) worldview on legal scholarship and practice. Unfortunately, they never met to discuss the similarities and differences of their jurisprudential ideas. In this article I try to reconstruct this conversation which never took place. Scholten’s legal thought is specifically oriented to the practice and difficulties of judging. Dooyeweerd above all was a philosopher whose specific philosophy of the modal aspects of reality is the basis for his thinking about the law. Both scholars emphasized the importance of legal principles. They also identified several fundamental legal categories and concepts. However, their methodology is different. The way religion and morality influence their legal thought is also different. A discussion of the contemporary relevance of their work completes the paper.

Professor Schauer covers many topics in this interview. On a general note, the interview covers themes pertaining to his experience in engaging with legal philosophy as a trained lawyer; his views on the present and the future of legal philosophy and how we shall cope with its development; his new book Thinking like a Lawyer; the role of legal philosophers in law and society; and some sincere suggestions to young legal philosophers. It also covers more specific topics, including discussions about his insistence on rule priority; differences between legal principles and rules; his opinion of legal positivism; and the pros and cons of analytical tools like spectrum, continuum and generality.