This article is a comment on Carel Smith’s paper. Smith rightly argues that the study of law has a hermeneutic character. But his interpretation of legal hermeneutics includes the thesis that in hard cases there is no right or true legal decision. This seems to have negative implications for the scholarly character of the study of law: in hard cases any solution goes. This paper argues, against Smith, that the study of law defends right answers for hard cases. It is also normative in another sense: legal answers, in easy cases as well as in hard cases, always presuppose a normative interpretation of the legal sources. This contributes to the differences of opinion under lawyers. But it is no obstacle to the scholarly character of the study of law, as long as a rational debate about these legal answers and the underlying values and principles is possible. Smith’s rejection of the right answer thesis, however, prevents the possibility of such a rational debate. |
Search result: 28 articles
Year 2009 xArticle |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | law and hermeneutics, law and normativity, one right answer thesis, legal jurisprudence, legal doctrine |
Authors | Prof. dr. Arend Soeteman |
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Book Review |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | public, private, adjudication, methodic individualism |
Authors | Prof. mr. Herman van Gunsteren |
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Herman van Gunsteren, book review of Gerard Drosterij, Politics as jurisdiction: a new understanding of public and private in political theory. Muiderberg: Eberson, 2008 |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | law and politics, right to strike, exceptionalism, Benjamin, political action |
Authors | Dr. mr. Klaas Tindemans |
AbstractAuthor's information |
This article discusses the right to strike, with special regard to Belgium. Referring to Walter Benjamin, Tindemans argues that strikes are rechtsetzend rather than rechtserhaltend; they constitute a legal order rather than preserve one. Strikes are exceptional phenomena within any legal system, as they do not fit normal criteria of legal validity. According to Tindemans, strikes are to be considered primarily as extralegal phenomena, as means in a political struggle, confronting the “police” of the core institutions of the state and the legal order. Strikes are political actions, moments of collective aspiration towards political equality, and as such threaten the “pureness” of the legal order in favour of a fragmented politics. |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, moral epistemology, objectivity, residues of justice, Bernard Williams, political moralism |
Authors | Mr. Iris van Domselaar |
AbstractAuthor's information |
Although Nussbaum’s “Capabilities Approach” (CA) clearly expresses a commitment to objectivity, this article argues that this commitment is rather ambiguous due to the conception of public reason it endorses. In particular, the CA cannot account for an objective justification of public reason, given certain characteristics of public reason. As a result, the CA jeopardizes the substantive aim it has set itself: to provide an objective justification for public choices regarding human capabilities and their specifications. |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | legal science, empirical science, law and astronomy, mathematical logic, game theory |
Authors | Mr. Boudewijn de Bruin |
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This article provides an outsider perspective on the scientificity of legal studies. First, I argue that the presence of controversies does not mean that legal studies lack the status of a genuine science. Astronomy, mathematics, and economics have their controversies, too. Second, I show that non-empirical, non-normative research is no less scientific than empirical research. This is illustrated by work in mathematical logic. Third, I demonstrate the same claim for non-empirical, normative research.Here the example is research on social contract theories by means of gametheoretic models. |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | legal theory, science, methodology, normativity, knowledge |
Authors | Prof. mr. Carel Smith |
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Propositions of law are based upon normative judgement. The interpretation and application of legal provisions rest upon a judgement that determines which weight must be attributed to some point of view or perspective. In this respect, legal theory has a normative character. Its normative character does not preclude legal theory from being a scientific discipline. The scientific character of legal theory is not located in the possibility of testing the correctness of its theories. Rather, legal theory owes it scientific character to the shared standards of production and evaluation of legal arguments: the grammar of justice. |
Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | ethics and law, banking law, juridification, Höffe, ethical principles |
Authors | Dr. mr. Jonathan Soeharno |
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In this editorial Soeharno takes a critical stand on the juridification of ethical principles within banking law. He argues that the legal incorporation of ethical principles, such as ‘integrity’ or ‘prudence’, is counter-productive. Within a legal context, these principles acquire a strictly legal significance and will be deprived of their essentially ethical character. |
Book Review |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | Foucault, supression thesis |
Authors | Mr. dr. Marc de Wilde |
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Marc de Wilde, book review of Ben Golder & Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2009 |
Book Review |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | methodic individualism, choice theory |
Authors | Dr. mr. Bertjan Wolthuis |
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Bertjan Wolthuis, book review of Jon Elster, Reason and Rationality, translated by Steven Rendall. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009 |
Book Review |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | political theology, economic theology, Schmitt, Peterson |
Authors | Dr. mr. Thom Holterman |
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Thom Holterman, book review of Giorgio Agamben, Le règne et la gloire. Homo sacer (II, 2). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2008 |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | individual responsibility, collective responsibility, legal liability, responsibility and politics |
Authors | prof. Philip Pettit |
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This paper responds to four commentaries on “Responsibility Incorporated”, restating, revising, and expanding on existing work. In particular, it looks again at a set of issues related primarily to responsibility at the individual level; it reconsiders responsibility at the corporate level; it examines the connection of this discussion to issues of responsibility in law and politics. |
Hoofdartikel |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | corporate agency, corporate responsibility, collective responsibility |
Authors | prof. Philip Pettit |
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Incorporated groups include businesses, universities, churches and the like. Organized to act as single centers of agency, they also routinely satisfy the three conditions that make an agent fit to be held responsible: they face significant choices, can recognize the relative value of different options, and are able to choose in sensitivity to such values. But is it redundant to hold a corporate agent responsible for something, when certain members are also held responsible for the individual parts they play? No it is not, for it is often possible for a corporate entity to be fully fit to be held responsible, when this is not true of the individual members; they may be able to make excuses that are not available at the corporate level. Does the case made for corporate responsibility extend to unincorporated collectivities like nations or religions? Not strictly but it does explain why it may be sensible to treat those collectivities as if they had corporate responsibility in certain domains. |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | collective responsibility, individual responsibility |
Authors | prof. Bert van den Brink |
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Whereas Pettit distinguishes between responsibility for the enactment of a directly harmful act and responsibility for the arrangement or constitution that channels the formation of a corporate agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions, we should acknowledge the existence of yet a third level of responsibility: the enactment of corporate arrangements that makes the enactment of harmful corporate actions likely or unavoidable. |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | responsibility, accountability, imputation, liability |
Authors | prof. Bert van Roermund and prof. Jan Vranken |
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Responsibility disappears into the background of private law as it deals with imputation of liability. Fitness to be held liable is determined by normative viewpoints different from moral ones, in particular by convictions on how society ought to be organized so as to avoid or end conflict between private citizens. Modes of discursive control are geared to making authoritative decisions in view of the same end, and corporate agency is created, restricted or enlarged to undercut or to impose individual liability. |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | collective responsibility, international legitimacy, global justice |
Authors | prof. Ronald Tinnevelt |
AbstractAuthor's information |
This paper critically scrutinizes Pettit’s defence of corporate and collective responsibility in the light three questions. First, does Pettit successfully argue the passage from corporate responsibility to the responsibility of embryonic group agents, in particular nations? Second, are representation and the authorial and editorial dimensions of democratic control sufficient to ensure that a state is under the effective and equally shared control of its citizens? Third, what kind of international order is required to prevent states from being dominated? |
Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Authors | prof. mr. Hans Lindahl and mr. Erik Claes |
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Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | collective criminal responsibility;, individual responsibility |
Authors | dr. Govert den Hartogh |
AbstractAuthor's information |
This paper argues, against Pettit’s thesis about the incorporation of responsibility, that holding collective agents criminally responsible is necessarily either redundant or unfair: redundant if responsibility can be distributed without remainder over individual persons; unfair if it cannot. It should be the task of legal systems to create chains of individual criminal responsibility encompassing executives, officials, and members of corporate agents. |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2009 |
Keywords | Vlaanderen, constitutie, Grondwet, fundamentele vrijheden |
Authors | Matthias Storme |
AbstractAuthor's information |
In light of the possibility that Belgium could fall apart in coming years this contribution argues that it is time to reflect on a constitution for Flanders: What are the characteristics of a good constitution? A good constitution would entrench fundamental freedoms, which are historically rooted in society. Moreover, it obliges the government to maintain and enforce the laws, preventing abuse of power and corruption. Finally, a functioning constitution stands above temporary interests of partisan politics, and should not be used as a means to encumber future generations with our ideological choices. |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2009 |
Keywords | normative positivism, historic injustice, restitution of property rights, citation of foreign law, methodology debate |
Authors | Kees Quist and Wouter Veraart |
AbstractAuthor's information |
This interview with Jeremy Waldron covers three topics. Firstly, we dealt with the methodology debate, that is, the discussion about how to proceed in analyzing the nature of law. Does the question ‘What is law?’ require a descriptive analysis of the concept of law or, rather, a normative exercise in political philosophy? Secondly, we spoke about the role of law in response to historic injustice, especially in relation to the restitution of property rights. On this topic Waldron vindicates the ‘supersession-thesis’, the idea that, due to changed circumstances and the passage of time, historic injustices become superseded. The third section of the interview is devoted to Waldron’s perspective on the citation of foreign law by national judges. |
Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2009 |
Authors | Jaap Hage |
AbstractAuthor's information |
In an editorial article the editors supply a commentary on the topics covered in the journal. |