Een bekend kenmerk van Scholtens beschouwingswijze was zijn dialectiek. |
Search result: 14 articles
Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2020 |
Authors | Elaine Mak, Anne Ruth Mackor and Iris van Domselaar |
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Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2019 |
Keywords | rechtsfilosofie, Vereniging voor Wijsbegeerte van het Recht, rechtspraktijk |
Authors | Hans Lindahl |
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Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2019 |
Keywords | Paul Scholten, dialectiek, existentialisme, Artificiële Intelligentie, ethische theologie |
Authors | Wim Borst |
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Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2017 |
Authors | Anne Ruth Mackor, Jeroen ten Voorde and Pauline Westerman |
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Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2013 |
Authors | Anne Ruth Mackor and Vincent Geeraets |
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Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2013 |
Authors | Antony Duff |
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This paper explores the roles that the presumption of innocence (PoI) can play beyond the criminal trial, in other dealings that citizens may have with the criminal law and its officials. It grounds the PoI in a wider notion of the civic trust that citizens owe each other, and that the state owes its citizens: by attending to the roles that citizens may find themselves playing in relation to the criminal law (such roles as suspect, defendant, convicted offender and ‘ex-offender’), we can see both how a PoI protects us, beyond the confines of the trial, against various kinds of coercion, and how that PoI is modified or qualified as we acquire certain roles. To develop and illustrate this argument, I pay particular attention to the roles of defendant (both during the trial and while awaiting trial) and of ‘ex-offender,’ and to the duties that such roles bring with them. |
Miscellaneous |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2012 |
Authors | Anne Ruth Mackor |
Author's information |
Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2010 |
Authors | Anne Ruth Mackor |
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“Het waren mijn genen, edelachtbare, niet ik” kopte NRC Handelsblad van donderdag 5 november 2009.1xFolkert Jensma, “Het waren mijn genen, edelachtbare, niet ik”, NRC Handelsblad, 5 november 2009. Het artikel bericht over een Italiaanse rechtszaak waarin in hoger beroep de straf die aan een moordenaar werd opgelegd, werd verlaagd van twaalf naar negen jaar. De raadsheer nam deze beslissing, aldus de verslaggever, nadat twee neurowetenschappers van de universiteiten van Pisa en Padua op een hersenscan onregelmatigheden hadden aangetoond en bovendien afwijkingen waren gevonden in het MAOA-gen, dat ook wel bekendstaat als het ‘agressiegen’. Noten
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Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2010 |
Keywords | Legitimation durch Verfahren, criminal law, expert-witnesses, truth, reliability of evidence |
Authors | Anne Ruth Mackor |
AbstractAuthor's information |
Huls has argued that the idea that judges are truth-finders is misleading. In the first part of the paper I put his claim to the test. Against Huls I argue that the aim of procedures in criminal lawsuits is not only to guarantee binding decisions but also to help to find the truth. In the second part of the paper I investigate the role expert-witnesses play in truth-finding. Cleiren and Loth have argued that experts fail to understand the differences between legal and scientific ways of truth-finding. It turns out that Cleiren does not offer an argument for her claim and that Loth’s claim fails too, since it confuses coherence as truth and coherence as epistemic justification. I conclude that legal scholars, rather than experts, fail to understand the nature of legal and scientific truth-finding. |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009 |
Keywords | legal theory, science, methodology, normativity, knowledge |
Authors | Prof. mr. Carel Smith |
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Propositions of law are based upon normative judgement. The interpretation and application of legal provisions rest upon a judgement that determines which weight must be attributed to some point of view or perspective. In this respect, legal theory has a normative character. Its normative character does not preclude legal theory from being a scientific discipline. The scientific character of legal theory is not located in the possibility of testing the correctness of its theories. Rather, legal theory owes it scientific character to the shared standards of production and evaluation of legal arguments: the grammar of justice. |
Book Review |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2008 |
Keywords | redelijkheid en billijkheid, kwaliteit, rechterlijke uitspraak, zorgplicht, ambtenaar, bestanddeel, confrontatie, Europees hof voor de rechten van de mens, gebrek, vrijheid van meningsuiting |
Authors | J. Zwart and F. Storm |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2007 |
Keywords | mededinging, moeder, aansprakelijkheid, betrouwbaarheid, claim, gebrek, idee, krediet, noodzakelijkheid, publicatieplicht |
Authors | J. Hage |
Book Review |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2007 |
Keywords | auteur, onderwijs, student, internet, aansprakelijkheid, advocatuur, belofte, downloaden, noodzakelijkheid, openbaar ministerie |
Authors | A.R. Mackor |
Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2005 |
Keywords | moord, rechtsstaat, strafrecht, wetgeving, geweld, politie, pleidooi, misdrijf, motivering, opzet |
Authors | K. Rozemond |